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2006]
COULD JESUS SERVE ON A JURY? NOT IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT:
RELIGION-BASED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN
UNITED STATES v. DEJESUS AND
BRONSHTEIN v. HORN
"Far from being rivals or enemies, religion and law are twin sisters,
friends, and mutual assistants. Indeed, these two sciences run into each
other. The divine law, as discovered by reason and the moral sense, forms
an essential part of both."I
-Justice James Wilson,
United States Supreme Court (1789-98)
I. INTRODUCTION: GENESIS
Peremptory challenges are a cornerstone of American jurispru-
dence. 2 Theoretically, peremptory challenges help secure a fair trial by
allowing lawyers to exclude presumptively biased jurors based on intui-
tion.3 In practice, they have been misused to exclude suspect classes from
juries, including African-Americans. 4 The past two decades have been a
tumultuous time for the use of peremptory challenges in jury selection.5
Before then, parties had the fight to exclude any person from a jury pool
1. 1 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONORABLE JAMES WILSON (Bird Wil-
son ed., Lorenzo Press 1804), repfinted in 1 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES
WILSON, at 125 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., Belknap Press 1967) (1804) (com-
menting on relationship between law and religion). Justice Wilson was one of
America's Founding Fathers: he was a signer of the Declaration of Independence,
twice elected to the Continental Congress, a major influence in drafting the na-
tion's Constitution, an erudite legal theoretician and one of the six original associ-
ate justices appointed by George Washington to the United States Supreme Court
in 1789. See 1 JAMES WILSON, THE WORS OF JAMES WILSON 1-2 (summarizing Jus-
tice Wilson's biography).
2. See, e.g.,J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (noting that peremptory challenges existed in Blackstone's time);
Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 481 (1990) (tracing peremptory challenges to
1790); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's
Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 809, 819 (1997) (recalling that peremptory chal-
lenges first appeared in England between 1220 and 1270 and courts allowed un-
limited peremptory challenges for Crown in capital cases); Adam P. Rosen, Factors
Affecting Juror Decisionmaking in Repressed-Memory Cases (Dec. 1996) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. thesis, Allegheny University), microformed on UMI Dissertation Ab-
stracts Database (UMI Dissertation Serv.) (dating peremptory challenges back to
Romans).
3. For a further discussion of peremptory challenges, see infra notes 28-34
and accompanying text.
4. For a further discussion of how peremptory challenges have been used to
exclude jurors based on race and gender, see infra notes 40-52 and accompanying
text.
5. For a further discussion of how the use of peremptory challenges has
changed, see infra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
(1057)
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without stating a reason. 6 In 1986, though, the United States Supreme
Court outlawed peremptory challenges based on race. 7 Later, in 1994, the
Court expanded this protection to gender.8 Recently, some lawyers have
argued that additional suspect groups should be entitled to the same
protection .9
Why not protect religion?10 The courts have not reached a consensus
regarding whether religion-based peremptory challenges are constitu-
tional and the Supreme Court has declined to resolve the issue. 1 Ameri-
can jurisprudence suggests that religion should be protected. 12 While on
the Third Circuit, Justice Samuel Alito suggested that religious affiliation-
based peremptory challenges are unconstitutional in Bronshtein v. Horn.
13
In United States v. DeJesus,1 4 however, the Third Circuit created an unusual
dichotomy: "[A]ssuming that the exercise of a peremptory strike on the
basis of religious affiliation is unconstitutional, the exercise of a strike
based on religious beliefs is not.' 5 The Dejesus court used "religious affili-
ation" to denote membership in a particular religious faction, as opposed
6. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (holding West Vir-
ginia statute unconstitutional because it banned African-Americans from juries).
7. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that eliminat-
ing jurors based on race violates juror's constitutional rights).
8. See generallyJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (admonishing
peremptory challenges based on gender). "Discrimination in jury selection,
whether based on race or on gender, causes harm to the litigants, the community,
and the individual jurors who are wrongfully excluded from participation in the
judicial process." Id. at 140 (citing Court's reasoning for extending Batson to
gender).
9. See generally United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2003) (arguing
in favor of extending Batson protections to religion-based peremptory challenges);
United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109 (7th Cir. 1998) (same); State v. Davis, 504
N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993) (noting that lawyer argued to extend Batson protections
to religion-based peremptory challenges, but court declined to do so).
10. See Robert T. Miller, A Jury of One's Godless Peers, FIRST THINGS, Mar. 2004,
at 11, 12 (explaining that Batson committed courts to justify theory of morally ac-
ceptable prejudices).
11. For a further discussion of the circuit split regarding religion-based per-
emptory challenges and the Supreme Court's denials of certiorari on the issue, see
infra notes 57-58, 134 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "); Am.
Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92 (1900):
[Dliscrimination . . . [that is] purely arbitrary, oppressive or capricious,
and made to depend upon differences of color, race, nativity, religious
opinions, political affiliations or other considerations having no possible
connection with the duties of citizens ... would be pure favoritism, and a
denial of the equal protection of the laws to the less favored classes.
Id. (noting example of Supreme Court protecting religion).
13. 404 F.3d 700 (3d Cir. 2005). For a detailed analysis of the Third Circuit's
opinion in Bronshtein, see infra notes 100-18 and accompanying text.
14. 347 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2003).
15. Id. at 510 (stating holding of case); see also United States v. Stafford, 136
F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating in dicta that "[i]t would be improper and
perhaps unconstitutional to strike a juror on the basis of his being a Catholic, a
[Vol. 51: p. 10571058
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 5 [2006], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss5/4
to subscribing to specific religious beliefs. 16 This is a critical issue in jury
selection because attorneys fear deeply religious people: defense lawyers
worry that deep religious beliefs signal a conservative, law-and-order orien-
tation, while prosecutors are concerned that intensely religious jurors will
be overly compassionate and hesitant to sit in judgment of others. 17
This Casebrief considers the Third Circuit's interpretation of religion-
based peremptory challenges. 18 Part II provides a brief overview of the
law governing peremptory challenges and the Equal Protection Clause. 19
Part III focuses on the Third Circuit's decision in Dejesus, particularly how
the court distinguished religious affiliation from religious belief.20 Part IV
analyzes the Third Circuit's suggestion in Bronshtein that religious affilia-
tion-based peremptory challenges are unconstitutional. 2 1 Part V examines
the Third Circuit's approach to religion-based peremptory challenges. 22
Finally, Part VI concludes that all religion-based peremptory challenges
should be held unconstitutional. 23
II. THE NATvITY: PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
every criminal defendant the right to a jury trial.24 Prior to trial, the ve-
Jew, a Muslim, etc.," but holding that "peremptory challenges based on religion is
unsettled").
16. See DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 510-11 (quoting Stafford, 136 F.3d at 1114) (defin-
ing "religious affiliation" and "religious belief').
17. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b) (5) (a) (2006) (allowing clergy to be excused from
jury service); TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-1-103(a) (2006) (exempting clergy from jury
service); United States v. Arnett, 342 F. Supp. 1255, 1257 (D. Mass. 1970) (excus-
ing ministers and other religious clergy arbitrarily from jury selection process);
Johnson v. Comm'r of Corr., 589 A.2d 1214, 1225 (Conn. 1991) (same). Compare
Randy D. Fisher et al., Religiousness, Religious Orientation, and Attitudes Towards Gays
and Lesbians, 24J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 614, 619-29 (1994) (noting that religious
fervor correlates with sexism, anti-homosexual beliefs and racism), with DeJesus, 347
F.3d at 503 (indicating that deeply religious people are unable to reach verdict),
and Stafford, 136 F.3d at 1113-14 (same).
18. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis in Dejesus and
Bronshtein, see infra notes 62-118 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the law governing peremptory challenges and
the Equal Protection Clause, see infra notes 24-58 and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's decision in Dejesus, see infra
notes 59-98 and accompanying text.
21. For a further discussion of the dicta in Bronshtein, see infra notes 99-118
and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of religion-based.peremptory challenges in the
Third Circuit, see infra notes 119-63 and accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion explaining why all religion-based peremptory
challenges should be held unconstitutional, see infra notes 164-74 and accompany-
ing text.
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
. . . . 1').
2006] CASEBRIF 1059
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nire, a pool of potential jurors, is formed when the court issues a jury
summons and divides the pool into smaller groups for specific trials.
25
The judge and attorneys for each side then question the potential jurors
on various topics, including their background, personal opinions and life
experiences through a process referred to as "voir dire."26 During this
process, an attorney may challenge a prospective juror either "for cause,"
or without cause by exercising a peremptory challenge.27
A. Peremptory Challenges
Peremptory challenges are an American common-law tradition and
play an integral role in empanelling a fair and impartial jury.28 William
Blackstone evangelized the peremptory challenge as a "provision full of
that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are
justly famous .... [T] he law wills not that he should be tried by any one
man against whom he has conceived a prejudice, even without being able
to assign a reason for such his dislike." 29 These discretionary challenges
made their way into American law from England and were codified in fed-
eral statutes as early as 1790.30 Since then, peremptory challenges have
25. See BLACK's LAw DIcrIONARv 1590 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "venire" as "[a]
panel of persons selected for jury duty and from among whom the jurors are to be
chosen"); Voir Dire: Creating the Jury, http://www.crfc.org/americanjury/voir-
dire.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006) (describing how venire is divided into differ-
ent groups for trial).
26. See FED. R. Crv. P. 47 (outlining federal voir dire procedure); FED. R. CRIM.
P. 24 (same); BLACK'S LAw DICrIONARY, supra note 25, at 1605 (defining "voir dire"
as "[a] preliminary examination of a prospective juror by ajudge or lawyer to de-
cide whether the prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury"); Sherry F.
Colb, Too Religious for the Jury?: A Federal Court Upholds Peremptory Challenges Based on
Religious Involvement (Nov. 5, 2003), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20031105.
html (explaining voir dire process).
27. See Peter Michael Collins, Taking Batson One Giant Step Further: The Court
Prohibits Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges inJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 44 CATH.
U. L. REV. 935, 937-38 (1995) (listing attorneys' choice of methods to exclude
jurors); see also BLAcK's LAw DIcrIONARv, supra note 25, at 245 (defining "challenge
for cause" as "[a] party's challenge supported by a specified reason, such as bias or
prejudice, that would disqualify that potential juror").
28. See United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining
historical importance of peremptory challenges). But cf. Georgia v. McCollum,
505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992) (reminding that peremptory challenge is not constitution-
ally protected fundamental right); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 620 (1991) ("(The] sole purpose [of the peremptory challenge] is to permit
litigants to assist the govemment in the selection of an impartial trier of fact.").
29. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *353.
30. See Cheryl G. Bader, Batson Meets the First Amendment: Prohibiting Peremptory
Challenges that Violate a Prospective Juror's Speech and Association Rights, 24 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 567, 575 (1996) (citing Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 112, 119)
(tracing peremptory challenges in United States back to 1790); Pamela R. Gar-
fieldJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Discrimination by Any Other Name..., 72 DENY. U.
L. REv. 169, 172 (1994) (stating that Framers did not include peremptory chal-
lenges in Constitution).
1060 [Vol. 51: p. 1057
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been used as an "arbitrary and capricious" method to challenge the seat-
ing of prospective jurors without reason or inquiry into motive. 3 1
Peremptories are intended for situations in which an attorney cannot
articulate a specific reason for objecting to a prospective juror, but has
some reason to believe a juror may be undesirable.3 2 Attorneys usually
exercise peremptory challenges based on intuition, making educated
guesses with the limited information that is available about the prospective
jurors.33 The danger of peremptory challenges is that they also permit a
lawyer to stereotype when exercising the allotted challenges. 34
B. The Equal Protection Clause
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees all persons equal protection under the law.3 5 Courts use three stan-
31. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1965) (holding that Constitu-
tion does not require explanation of motives for peremptory challenges); Lewis v.
United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892) (quoting Lamb v. State, 36 Wis. 424, 427
(1874)) (describing peremptory challenge as "arbitrary and capricious right; and it
must be exercised with full freedom, or it fails of its full purpose"); DeJesus, 347
F.3d at 505 ("The decision to exercise a peremptory strike need not be supported
by any reason."); Collins, supra note 27, at 938 (commenting that, unlike for cause
eliminations, peremptory challenges allow attorneys to strike jurors without justifi-
cation); John H. Mansfield, Peremptory Challenges to Jurors Based Upon or Affecting
Religion, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 435, 447 (2004) (citing Holland v. Illinois, 493
U.S. 474, 480 (1990)) (arguing that allowing lawyers to strike jurors without ratio-
nale makes verdicts more acceptable to all parties).
32. See United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 394 n.5 (3d Cir. 1993) (il-
lustrating circumstance where peremptory challenge is useful). See generally John
P. Marks, Bader v. State: The Arkansas Supreme Court Restricts the Role Religion May
Play injury Selection, 55 ARK. L. REv. 613 (2002) (noting importance of peremptory
challenge when concern about potential juror's fairness does not warrant chal-
lenge for cause).
33. See DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 505 (demonstrating that lawyers base peremptory
challenges on probabilities and limited information); Bader, supra note 30, at 576
(citing State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1167 (N.J. 1986)) (commenting that per-
emptory challenges are often based on intuition and past experiences).
34. See, e.g.,J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 141 (1994) ("All per-
sons . . . have the right not to be excluded summarily because of discriminatory
and stereotypical presumptions . . . ."); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (discussing damaging effects of peremptory challenges based
on discriminatory motives); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991) (same); cf
McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 968 (1983) (Marshall,J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (quoting Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946)) (arguing
that harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond defendant and ex-
cluded juror and undermines public confidence in fairness of American justice
system); Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) (stating that excluding
minorities produces "injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the
community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our
courts").
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall .. . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879) ("[The Fourteenth
Amendment's purpose was] securing to a race recently emancipated, a race that
through many generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the
2006] CASEBRIEF 1061
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dards of review to examine the constitutionality of government action that
impacts the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause: rational basis test,
intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny.3 6 Rational basis review is enor-
mously deferential; a court will uphold a law that is rationally related to a
legitimate government purpose. 37 Under intermediate scrutiny, a court
will uphold a law if it is substantially related to an important government
purpose."8 Finally, under strict scrutiny, a court will uphold a law if it is
necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.39
C. Batson v. Kentucky: Race-Based Peremptory Challenges
Struck Down by the High Court
The Supreme Court's decision in Batson marked the first time the
Court placed a serious limitation on the use of peremptory challenges. 40
In Batson, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a prose-
cutor from peremptorily challenging potential jurors based on race. 4'
[majority] race enjoy."); Dyszel v. Marks, 6 F.3d 116, 124-25 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating
that Equal Protection Clause bars governing body from applying law dissimilarly to
people who are similarly situated); Bratton v. City of Florence, 688 So. 2d 233, 235
(Ala. 1996) (same).
36. For a further discussion of the standards of review used in equal protec-
tion analysis, see infra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366-67
(2001) (employing rational basis review); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14
(1988) (same); United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175 (1980)
(same); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527-28 (1959) (same); Williamson v.
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (same); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Mis-
souri, 342 U.S. 421, 427 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (same).
38. See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266 (1983) (explaining situa-
tions where courts apply intermediate scrutiny review); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976) (same); Lawrence Schlam, Equality in Culture and Law: An Introduc-
tion to the Origins and Evolution of the Equal Protection Principle, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
425, 446-47 (2004) (illustrating that gender, alienage and illegitimacy warrant in-
termediate scrutiny).
39. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 222 (1995) (describ-
ing circumstances in which courts apply strict scrutiny); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634, 649 (1973) (same); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-08 (1963)
(same) ;JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 575 (4th ed.
1991) (same); Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REv. 835, 867-68 (2004)
(same); Marianne E. Kreisher, Religion: The Cognizable Difference in Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 5 WIDENERJ. PUB. L. 131, 165-68 (1995) ("Strict scrutiny is the highest level
[of scrutiny] and applies to classifications based on suspect classes and fundamen-
tal rights."); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986)
("Under strict scrutiny the means chosen to accomplish the State's asserted pur-
pose must be specifically and narrowly tailored to accomplish that purpose.").
40. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that Equal
Protection Clause forbids race-based peremptory challenges).
41. See id. at 85-89 (holding that "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the
prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race ....").
Previously, in Strauder v. West Virginia, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's purpose was to ensure that African-Americans were subject to, and granted
protection by, the same laws as their white counterparts. See 100 U.S. 303, 310
(1879) (announcing rule prohibiting states from excluding individuals from juries
[Vol. 51: p. 10571062
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The case involved the trial of an African-American man charged with bur-
glary and receipt of stolen goods.4 2 At trial, the prosecutor used the
state's peremptory challenges to strike all four African-Americans from the
venire, creating an all-white jury.43 In response, the Court developed a
three-step process, known as a "Batson hearing," to evaluate whether a
prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.4 4 First, the defendant must make a prima facie case that
because of race); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAw 172-80 (1997) (ac-
knowledging that, although Strauder served to outlaw statutes excluding African-
Americans from juries, states still managed to preclude African-Americans). After
Strauder outlawed the statutory racial ban on juries, prosecutors began to rely on
peremptory challenges to create a similar exclusionary effect. See Swain v. Ala-
bama, 380 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1965) (acknowledging that parties used peremptory
challenges as exclusionary tool); Michael W. Kirk, Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments- The Swain Song of the Racially Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 77J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 821, 823-27 (1986) (discussing Swain and states' use of
peremptory challenges to specifically remove African-Americans from jury in case
with African-American defendant); George Bundy Smith, Swain v. Alabama: The
Use of Peremptory Challenges to Strike Blacks from Juries, 27 How. L.J. 1571, 1572-95
(1984) (same). While the Court recognized that using peremptory challenges as a
pretext for racial discrimination violates one's constitutional rights, it established
an exceedingly high evidentiary burden for the party to prove discrimination, leav-
ing many defendants unable to challenge the state's use of the strikes. See Swain,
308 U.S. at 224 (requiring defendant to demonstrate history or trend of discrimi-
nation from other cases).
42. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 82 (stating facts of case).
43. See id. at 82-83 (detailing composition of jury).
44. See id. at 89-96 (establishing Batson test). But see Miller, supra note 10, at
12 (arguing that Batson hearings are absurd because lawyers try to explain unex-
plainable and justify actions previously allowed without justification). In a Batson
hearing:
[T] he defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable
racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory chal-
lenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. Sec-
ond, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be
no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection prac-
tice that permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to discrimi-
nate." Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other
relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that
practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their
race.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97 (citations omitted) (outlining requirements for making
prima facie case under Batson). For example, "a 'pattern' of strikes against black
jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimi-
nation." Id. at 97 (demonstrating that stark pattern of peremptorily striking nu-
merous African-American jurors and no others is sufficient for prima facie
showing). The Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant may establish a
prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination based solely on evidence con-
cerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's
trial, without showing repeated instances of such discriminatory conduct over a
number of cases. See id. at 89-96 (rejecting portion of Swain concerning eviden-
tiary burden placed on defendant).
20061 CASEBRIEF 1063
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the prosecutor exercised the peremptory challenge on the basis of race.4 5
Second, once the defendant establishes a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking
the juror in question. 46 Finally, the trial court must determine whether
the defendant satisfied the burden of proving purposeful discrimina-
tion. 47 This procedure represented the first exception to the universal
rule that lawyers may use peremptory challenges for any reason or no rea-
son at all.
4 8
D. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.:
The Supreme Court Expands Batson to Protect Gender
In JE.B., the Supreme Court extended the rule from Batson to in-
clude peremptory challenges based on gender.49 J.E.B. involved a pater-
nity suit, in which the state of Alabama used nine of its ten peremptory
challenges to remove male jurors, empanelling an all-female jury.50 This
case presented the issue of whether the Court should read Batson to pro-
hibit intentional discrimination premised on gender, just as it prohibited
discrimination on the basis of race. 5 1 The Court held that gender, like
race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality
because "[i] ntentional discrimination on the basis of gender by state ac-
tors violates the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where . . .the dis-
crimination serves to ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and
overbroad stereotypes. '52
45. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97 (listing first step for making prima facie case
under Batson); see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1991) (same).
46. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97 (detailing second requirement of prima facie
showing under Batson); see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-59 (same). The prosecu-
tor may not rebut a prima facie showing on the assumption that the jurors would
be partial to the defendant because of their shared race or by attesting to one's
good faith in the selection process. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98 (citing examples
of inappropriate reasons for striking jurors).
47. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97 (explaining third step necessary to make
prima facie case under Batson); see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-59 (same);
United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 394 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Haines v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 92 (3d Cir. 1992)) ("[T]he appellate court must
accept the factual determination of the fact finder unless that determination 'ei-
ther (1) is completely devoid of minimum evidentiary support displaying some hue
of credibility, or (2) bears no rational relationship to the supportive evidentiary
data"').
48. See Stephen I. Shaw, Batson v. Kentucky: The Court's Response to the Problem
of Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 581, 582 (1986)
(highlighting Batson as Supreme Court's response to racially motivated peremp-
tory challenges).
49. See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (stating
holding of case).
50. See id. at 129 (stating facts of case).
51. See id. (presenting defendant's argument that Batson should apply to
gender).
52. Id. at 130-31.
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Since J.E.B., the Court has broadened Batson's basic constitutional
rule beyond peremptory challenges that the prosecution asserts in crimi-
nal cases.53 The Court has ruled that the Batson anti-discrimination test
applies to both criminal defendants' and private litigants' use of peremp-
tory challenges.5 4 Furthermore, the Court ruled that Batson applies to fed-
eral criminal proceedings through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, which affords safeguards similar to the Equal Protection
Clause.
5 5
But what about religion?5 6 There is no consensus among the circuit
courts with respect to the use of peremptory challenges based on relig-
ion. 57 State courts also are not uniform in their approach to this issue.
5 8
53. For a further discussion of how the Court has expanded the holding in
Batson, see infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
54. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 48 (1992) (applying Batson to crimi-
nal defendants); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991)
(extending Batson to civil cases).
55. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (applying Batson's antidis-
crimination test to federal court ciminal proceedings based on Due Process
Clause); United States v. Townsley, 856 F.2d 1189, 1192 (8th Cir. 1988) (Henley, J.,
dissenting) (same); United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 1987)
(allowing Batson challenges in federal criminal proceedings based on Due Process
Clause); United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1987) (same).
56. For a further discussion of the reasons why the Supreme Court should
extend Batson to include religion-based peremptory challenges, see infra notes 124-
59 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., United States v. Berger, 224 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 2000) (declin-
ing to decide whether Batson extends to challenges based on religious affiliation
because prosecutor provided another reason for strike); Fisher v. Texas, 169 F.3d
295, 303 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting lack of clarity regarding whether Batson applies to
religious affiliation); United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998)
(stating in dicta that "it would be improper and perhaps unconstitutional to strike
ajuror on the basis of his being a Catholic, ajew, a Muslim, etc.," but holding that
"status of peremptory challenges based on religion is unsettled"); United States v.
Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1086 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that Batson extends to
religion), affd by an equally divided court, 968 F.2d 433, 437 n.7, 445 (5th Cir. 1992)
(en banc) (avoiding issue of whether Batson applies to religion); United States v.
Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1158 (3d Cir. 1989) (implying that Batson does not
cover religion, although defendant did not properly preserve issue); United States
v. Somerstein, 959 F. Supp. 592, 596 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that Batson covers
religious affiliation); United States v. Williams, 44 M.J. 482, 485 (C.A.A.F. 1996)
(rejecting defendant's claim that Batson applies to religion).
58. Compare State v. Purcell, 18 P.3d 113, 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (holding
that Batson encompasses peremptory challenges based on religious affiliation),
Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145, 1153 (Colo. 1987) (concluding that peremptories
based on religious affiliation violate at least state constitution), State v. Hodge, 726
A.2d 531, 553 (Conn. 1999) (holding that federal law prohibits peremptories
based on religious affiliation), State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 848 (Haw. 1990)
(concluding that peremptories based on religious affiliation violate at least state
constitution), Thorson v. State, 721 So. 2d 590, 594 (Miss. 1998) (ruling that state
law prohibits exercising peremptory challenges based solely on religion), State v.
Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1159 (N.J. 1986) (concluding that peremptories based on
religious affiliation violate at least state constitution), State v. Fuller, 812 A.2d 389,
397 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (excludingjurors based on religious affiliation
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III. THE CRUCIFIXION: THE THIRD CIRCUIT REJECTS EXTENDING
BATSON TO PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BASED ON
HEIGHTENED RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
Religion is a divisive subject that courts often seek to avoid.5 9 The
lack of consensus among courts concerning religion-based peremptory
challenges has created widespread confusion. 60 Nevertheless, in light of
the recent decisions in DeJesus and Bronshtein, the analysis has become well-
defined in the Third Circuit. 6
1
A. United States v. Jesus?: Facts and Procedural History
In an ironically-named case, United States v. Dejesus, the government
charged Jerry Dejesus with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 62
During jury selection, prospective juror Ronald McBride revealed that
much of his life centered on his religion and that he learned to forgive his
cousin's killer.63 Prospective jurorJames Bates also indicated a similar re-
violates state constitution's Equal Protection Clause), People v. Langston, 641
N.Y.S.2d 513, 514-15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (ruling that state law prohibits exercising
peremptory challenges based solely on religion), and State v. Eason, 445 S.E.2d
917, 920 (N.C. 1994) (concluding that peremptories based on religious affiliation
violate at least state constitution), with State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn.
1993) (declining to extend Batson to strikes based on religious affiliation), State v.
Gowdy, 727 N.E.2d 579, 586 (Ohio 2000) (allowing attorney to strike juror for
wearing cross), Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en
banc) (holding that state interests in peremptory challenges justify excluding ju-
rors based on their religious affiliation), andJames v. Commonwealth, 442 S.E.2d
396, 398 (Va. 1994) (same).
59. See, e.g., United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 510 (3d Cir. 2003) (deem-
ing it unnecessary for court to address whether peremptory challenge based solely
on religious affiliation would be constitutional because government's challenges
were based on jurors' heightened religious involvement rather than their religious
affiliation); Berger, 224 F.3d at 120 (declining to decide whether Batson extends to
religious affiliation-based challenges because prosecutor provided independent
reason for strike).
60. For a further discussion of the diversity of opinion among courts regard-
ing religion-based challenges, see supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
61. For a further discussion outlining the Third Circuit's analysis of religion-
based peremptory challenges, see infra notes 62-118 and accompanying text.
62. See Dejesus, 347 F.3d at 502 (stating facts of case). Dejesus's first trial en-
ded in a mistrial after the jury was unable to reach a verdict. See id. (stating facts of
case). After a three-day retrial, the jury found Dejesus guilty and sentenced him to
prison for 110 months, three years of supervised release and a special assessment
of $100. See id. (stating procedural history of case).
63. See Transcript of Jury Selection on Oct. 9, 2001 at 52, 85-86, United States
v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2003) (Crim. No. 99-728) (D.NJ. Jan. 24, 2002)
(indicating that McBride participates in civic activities through his church, reads
Christian Book Dispatcher, holds several biblical degrees, is deacon and Sunday
School teacher in local church and sings in two church choirs). The district court
conducted jury selection in Dejesus in three phases: (1) prospective jurors com-
pleted a questionnaire; (2) district court conducted individual voir dire of prospec-
tive jurors; and (3) attorneys exercised their allotted peremptory strikes. See
DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 502 (summarizing jury selection procedure).
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ligious proclivity. 64 The government then exercised peremptory chal-
lenges against McBride and Bates, both of whom were African-
American. 65 Defense counsel responded with two race-based Batson chal-
lenges.66 Although both jurors stated that they would follow the law and
consider only the evidence presented at trial, the prosecution argued that
their strong religious beliefs outweighed their desire to serve as fair and
impartial jurors. 67
Defense counsel argued that religion-based peremptory challenges
are just as improper as those based on race and urged the district court to
grant a Batson challenge on that ground.68 The district court denied the
defendant's Batson challenges, explaining that the defendant's challenges
were not "based on some denomination of religion, but [were] chal-
lenge [s] based upon how the jurors chose to spend their time, reading the
bible. 69 The district court opined that " [w] hile Batson may extend to pro-
tect against striking a potential juror based upon the juror's membership
in a particular religious denomination having no relevance to the issues in
the case, none of these jurors were struck by the government upon an
impermissible ground.
70
64. See Transcript of Jury Selection, supra note 63, at 50, 89 (indicating that
Bates is officer and trustee for church, he reads Bible and related literature and his
hobbies include church activities).
65. See id. at 85 (noting race of challenged jurors).
66. See id. at 84 (explaining defense's challenges to constitutionality of per-
emptory challenge under Batson). Although the government was not called upon
to explain its reasoning, it also used another peremptory challenge to remove pro-
spective juror George B. Pressey, a Caucasian man, who cited being active in his
church, including serving on the board of trustees, organizing the construction of
a new sanctuary and being in charge of the ushering department. See id. at 101-05
(neglecting to challenge government's strike against Pressey because defendant
did not object to strike when it was exercised).
67. See id. at 85-95 (explaining that strike against McBride was based on po-
tential juror's high degree of religious involvement and ability to forgive his
cousin's murderer, both of which might make him reluctant to convict). The gov-
ernment explained that Bates's "fairly strong religious beliefs" might prevent him
from passing judgment against another person and that he appeared unwilling to
make eye contact with the prosecution, demonstrating a possible anti-government
bias. See id. at 89 (indicating that Bates "looked the government's way and then
turned his eyes away several times").
68. See id. at 87 (stating defendant's argument).
69. Id. at 94 (noting that although both Bates and McBride indicated that
"they studied and read the Bible," which indicates that they were both Christian,
government was unaware of jurors' particular religious affiliation).
70. United States v. Dejesus, Crim. No. 99-728, slip op. at 2 (D.N.J. Jan. 24,
2002) (stating holding of case and reasoning for denial of defendant's mistrial
application).
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B. The Praetorium:7 1 The Third Circuit's Analysis
1. Carrying the Cross-Destination Golgotha:72 The Majority Opinion
In a two-to-one decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 73 Circuit Judge Fuen-
tes framed the issue in Dejesus as whether the government violated the
Equal Protection Clause when it peremptorily struck two African-Ameri-
can jurors, who were presumably Christian, from the venire.74 While the
defendant raised Batson challenges on both race and religion, the analysis
at issue focused on the religion-based challenge. 75 The Third Circuit af-
71. See John 18:28 (referring to court where Jesus was brought to trial before
Pontius Pilate); Mark 15:16 (same); Matthew 27:27 (same). All biblical quotations
contained in this Casebrief are taken from The Holy Bible, Revised Standard
Version, Oxford University Press, 1977.
72. Golgotha (GilgaltA in Aramaic), or the place of the skull, refers to the hill
outside Jerusalem on which Jesus was crucified, as is mentioned in all four
accounts of Jesus's crucifixion in the Christian canonical Gospels. See, e.g., John
19:17 ("So they took Jesus, and he went out, bearing his own cross, to the place
called the place of a skull, which is called in Hebrew Gol'gotha."); Luke 23:33
("And when they came to the place which is called The Skull, there they crucified
him, and the criminals, one on the right and one on the left."); Mark 15:22 ("And
they brought him to the place called Gol'gotha (which means the place of a
skull)."); Matthew 27:33 ("And when they came to a place called Gol'gotha (which
means the place of a skull) .... ").
73. See United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 2003) (affirming
decision of United States District Court for District of New Jersey that prosecution
did not utilize peremptory challenges in violation of Batson). Circuit Judge Fuen-
tes delivered the opinion of the court and was joined by Judge William C. O'Kelley,
United States District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia, sitting by desig-
nation. See id. (holding that it is unconstitutional to exercise peremptory chal-
lenge on basis of religious affiliation, but it is constitutional to base challenge on
strength of religious beliefs). Judge Stapleton provided the dissenting opinion.
See id. at 513 (Stapleton, J., dissenting) (opining that prosecution discriminated
against jurors based on practice of their religion because Equal Protection Clause
bars use of stereotypes based on religion when exercising peremptory challenges).
74. See id. at 501-02 (majority opinion) (framing issue of case); see also Davis v.
Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1117 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cer-
tiorari) (applying Batson to religious affiliation); United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d
654, 668-69 (2d Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114
(7th Cir. 1998) (same); State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 553 (Conn. 1999) (same).
But see State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) (declining to extend Bat-
son to religious affiliation); Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 496 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994) (en banc) (same). In his appeal before the Third Circuit, DeJesus argued
that Batson extends to peremptory challenges based on religious affiliation and
that the government impermissibly struck McBride and Bates on the basis of their
Christian affiliation. See id. at 505 (stating appellant's cause of appeal). Dejesus
did not challenge the government's strike against Pressey on appeal because relig-
ious affiliation was not the primary reason for that strike and the defendant did
not make a prima facie case when it was exercised. See Brief for Appellant at 31
n.6, United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500 (3d Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1394) (explain-
ing why Dejesus failed to challenge Pressey's strike).
75. See DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 506-11 (noting that defendant pled in alternative
for both race and religion). In Dejesus, the issue of whether the government exer-
cised peremptory challenges to remove members of a particular race was moot
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firmed the district court's determination that the government based its
peremptory strikes on the jurors' "heightened religious involvement" and
not on either race or a specific religious affiliation and, therefore, acted
constitutionally.
7 6
According to the district court, "the categorical striking of a juror
based upon denomination affiliation . . . would be constitutionally offen-
sive to the guarantee of free religious affiliation." 7 7 Nevertheless, accord-
ing to the district court, the prosecution's concerns derived from the
potential jurors' unusual degree of religious involvement. 78 The district
court held that the jurors' extraordinary amount of religious activity sug-
gested strong religious beliefs that may affect the jurors' judgment, but
were not linked to a specific religion.7 9 The record supported the prose-
cution's argument that both excluded jurors heavily participated in relig-
ious activities.8 0
because the government offered an explanation for its peremptory strikes before
the district court addressed the adequacy of the prima facie showing. See id. at 506
(quoting United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995 F.2d 388, 392 (3d Cir. 1993)) (explain-
ing that when government offers explanation for its peremptory strikes before dis-
trict court addresses adequacy of prima facie showing, any issue regarding
existence of prima facie showing of discrimination becomes moot).
76. See id. at 502 (stating holding of case in Dejesus). The Seventh Circuit
reached a similar conclusion when faced with the same question. See Stafford, 136
F.3d at 1114:
[I]t is necessary to distinguish among religious affiliation, a religion's
general tenets, and a specific religious belief .... It would be proper to
strike [a juror] on the basis of a belief that would prevent him from bas-
ing his decision on the evidence and instructions, even if the belief had a
religious backing ....
Id. (bifurcating analysis between religious affiliation and heightened religious be-
lief). Several state courts have made a similar distinction between challenges pre-
mised on religious beliefs and affiliation. See, e.g., State v. Purcell, 18 P.3d 113, 122
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (holding challenge constitutional when based on juror's per-
sonal beliefs and not religious affiliation); State v. Fuller, 862 A.2d 1130, 1138 (N.J.
2004) (finding peremptory challenge permissible when based on prosecutor's in-
ference from juror's traditional Muslim clothing that juror was religiously devout
and, therefore, likely to be defense-oriented); Brian H. Bornstein & Monica K.
Miller, Does Religion Predict Juror Decisions?, MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY, May 2005, at
92 (explaining that many lawyers believe religiosity affects decision-making).
77. United States v. Dejesus, Crim. No. 99-728, slip op. at 18 (D.N.J. Jan. 24,
2002) (noting district court's opposition to peremptory challenges based on relig-
ious affiliation).
78. See id. at 22 (citing that prosecution was not concerned with religious affil-
iation, but with heightened religiosity).
79. See id. (implying that jurors' heightened religiosity affects jurors'
judgment).
80. For a further discussion of the jurors' strong religious proclivity, see supra
notes 63-64 and accompanying text. The district court elaborated that:
[F] aced with a prospective juror whose answers to neutral questions re-
garding hobbies, pastimes, reading materials, television programs and the
like reveal a rather consuming propensity to experience the world
through the prism of religious beliefs, it is rational for a prosecutor to act
upon the concern about reluctance to convict.
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According to the Third Circuit, the distinction between a challenge
motivated by religious beliefs and one motivated by religious affiliation
was valid and proper.8 1 The common thread among the government's
challenges was the concern that the jurors' religious beliefs-as reflected
by their reading choices, hobbies, statements and demeanor in court-
would tend to make them unable or unwilling to pass judgment on an-
other human being.8 2 Therefore, even if the exercise of a peremptory
challenge on the basis of religious affiliation is unconstitutional, the exer-
cise of a challenge based on strong religious beliefs is not.8 3 Because the
Third Circuit held that the government's challenges derived from the ju-
rors' heightened religious involvement rather than their religious affilia-
tion, it was unnecessary for the court to address whether a peremptory
challenge based solely on religious affiliation would be constitutional.8 4
Therefore, the question remains open in the Third Circuit.8 5
2. The Voice of One Crying in the Wilderness." 6 The Dissenting Opinion
In his dissent, Judge Stapleton urged that it was discriminatory for the
prosecution to exercise peremptory challenges against McBride and Bates
on account of their religious practice. 87 A classification based on height-
DeJesus, Crim. No. 99-728, at 19-20 (justifying peremptory challenges based on
heightened religiosity).
81. See DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 511 (holding that district court's finding that gov-
ernment struck jurors because their heightened religiosity would render them un-
able or unwilling to convict was not erroneous).
82. See id. at 508 (stating that prosecutor exercised peremptory challenge be-
cause of religious beliefs and not religious affiliation). Contra Miller, supra note 10,
at 12 ("[T]he usual stereotype about religious people is just the opposite-namely,
that they tend to impose their values on others.").
83. See DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 510 (stating holding of case); see also Daniel M.
Hinkle, Peremptory Challenges Based on Religious Affiliation: Are They Constitutional?, 9
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 139, 144 (2005) (arguing that Constitution forbids using per-
emptory challenges based solely on stereotypes about religions, but juror's actual
stated beliefs are proper basis for exclusion even if those beliefs are religiously
inspired).
84. See DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 510 (circumventing issue whether it is constitu-
tional to exercise peremptory challenges based on religious affiliation because
Third Circuit limited holding to religious belief).
85. For a further discussion ofJustice Alito's analysis in Bronshtein concerning
religion-based peremptory challenges, see infra notes 107-18 and accompanying
text.
86. See John 1:23 ("He said, 'I am the voice of one crying in the wilderness,
'Make straight the way of the Lord,' as the prophet Isaiah said.'").
87. See DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 515 (Stapleton,J., dissenting) (stating that govern-
ment believed McBride and Bates would be reluctant to convict or pass judgment
on another human because of their religious faith). Judge Stapleton also recog-
nized that neutral grounds for striking McBride and Bates may have played a role
in the prosecutor's decisions. See id. (indicating that McBride learned to forgive
his cousin's killer and Bates diverted his eyes from prosecution during voir dire).
Judge Stapleton otherwise concurred with the court's disposition of Dejesus's race-
based peremptory challenge. See id. at 513 (noting that non-religious grounds for
striking jurors may have played role in prosecutor's decisions).
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ened religious involvement is no less based on religion than a classification
based on religious affiliation. 8 Therefore, ajuror's religious practice can-
not be used as the sole basis for attributing a particular belief to the juror
and exercising a peremptory challenge.89
The Third Circuit previously noted, in Rico v. Leftridge-Byrd,90 that
JE.B. held that the "'Equal Protection Clause bars peremptory challenges
based on gender and, it strongly suggested, on any classification otherwise
receiving 'heightened scrutiny' under the Clause."' 9 1 Furthermore, when
state action "establishes 'a classification... drawn upon inherently suspect
distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage' . . ., it must meet the strict
scrutiny standard .... ,92 Therefore, Judge Stapleton reasoned that the
"Equal Protection Clause bars the use of stereotypes based upon religion
in exercising peremptory challenges." 9 3
Although a prosecutor may strike a juror for being unwilling to judge
another person, a prosecutor may not-consistent with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause-infer solely from a prospective juror's race, gender or relig-
ion that he or she would be unwilling to judge another.94 While a litigant
may peremptorily strike a juror because of a potential religious bias, a ju-
ror's religious affiliation or practice cannot be used as the sole basis for
88. See id. at 515 (refuting majority's holding that striking juror based on re-
ligious affiliation may violate Equal Protection Clause, but striking juror based on
heightened religious involvement does not).
89. See id. at 514 (stating that sole basis for government's belief that McBride
and Bates would be reluctant to convict or pass judgment on another person is
their religious practice).
90. 340 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 2003).
91. DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 514 (Stapleton,J., dissenting) (quoting Rico, 340 F.3d
at 182) (proffering that Equal Protection Clause bars use of stereotypes based on
religion when attorneys exercise peremptory challenges). For a further discussion
of the standards of review, see supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
92. DeHart v. Horn, 227 F.3d 47, 61 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing Maldo-
nado v. Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1998)) ("[C]lassification[s] that
draw[ ] upon suspect distinctions, such as religion, '[are] subject to strict scrutiny
and will pass constitutional muster only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compel-
ling state interest."'); Schumacher v. Nix, 965 F.2d 1262, 1266 (3d Cir. 1992)
(quoting City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)) (holding that
when state action establishes classification that is drawn on inherently suspect dis-
tinctions, it must meet strict scrutiny standard); see also Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)) ("[A) suspect class is one saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or rele-
gated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary
protection from the majoritarian political process.").
93. DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 514 (Stapleton, J., dissenting) (referring to JE.B., in
which Court strongly suggested that Equal Protection Clause bars peremptory chal-
lenges based on any classification receiving heightened scrutiny).
94. See id. (arguing that basing peremptory challenge on inference that juror
will be unwilling to sit in judgment of another person violates Equal Protection
Clause).
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attributing such a particular belief to the juror.95 In Dejesus, the voir dire
transcript reveals no indication that either McBride or Bates would have
been reluctant to convict or pass judgment on another person.96 Had
they exhibited any such reluctance, the government would have been justi-
fied in exercising the peremptory challenges, regardless of the religious
overtone. 97 Conversely, both McBride and Bates indicated that they
would follow the law and base their decision upon the evidence presented
at trial.9 8
IV. THE RESURRECTION: JUST DIcTA OR A SIGN FROM ABOVE?
JUSTICE ALITO'S OPINION IN BRONSHTEIN v. HORN
A. The Chosen People:99 Jury Selection in Bronshtein
Shortly after Dejesus, in Bronshtein, the Third Circuit again addressed
whether religion-based peremptory challenges are constitutional.1 00 In
Bronshtein, Antuan Bronshtein was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of
first-degree murder and sentenced to death. 10 1 During jury selection,
when Jan Eidelson, a potential juror, came up for voir dire, the prosecutor
stated that he wanted to inquire into her religion "only because of the
educational background" noted on her juror questionnaire. I0 2 Ms. Eidel-
son stated that, although she was a graduate of Friends Central High
95. See id. (noting that exercising peremptory challenge based solely on relig-
ious affiliation violates Equal Protection Clause).
96. For a further discussion of the information gathered during voir dire, see
supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
97. See DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 515 (Stapleton, J., dissenting) (justifying peremp-
tory challenge against juror if juror is reluctant to convict or pass judgment on
another person).
98. See id. (noting that McBride and Bates were not reluctant to convict or
pass judgment on another person).
99. See, e.g., Amos 3:2 ('You only have I known of all the families of the earth;
therefore I will punish you for all your iniquities."); Deuteronomy 7:6 ("For you are a
people holy to the LORD your God; the LORD your God has chosen you to be a
people for his own possession, out of all the peoples that are on the face of the
earth."); Deuteronomy 14:2 ("For you are a people holy to the LORD your God, and
the LoRD has chosen you to be a people for his own possession, out of all the
peoples that are on the face of the earth."); Exodus 19:5-6 ("[Y]ou shall be my own
possession among all peoples; for all the earth is mine, and you shall be to me a
kingdom of priests and a holy nation. These are the words which you shall speak
to the children of Israel.").
100. See Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 724 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that
petitioner failed to make prima facie case under Batson). For a further discussion
of the facts and analysis in Bronshtein, see infra notes 101-18 and accompanying
text.
101. See id. at 703-04 (stating facts of case).
102. See id. at 720 (noting thatjuror attended Quaker high school). The trial
judge stated that this inquiry was legitimate because "it cannot be disputed that if
someone is a Quaker they hold a religious belief that would prevent them, proba-
bly, from serving on this jury" because it was a death penalty case. See id. at 721
(noting that Quakers would likely be unable to impose death sentence).
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School, she was not a Quaker, but rather aJew. 10 3 Eidelson indicated that,
although it "would [not] be easy," she could vote to impose the death
penalty and stand up in open court to state that she voted to impose that
sentence.' 0 4 The prosecutor, however, still exercised a peremptory chal-
lenge against Eidelson. 10 5 Defense counsel objected, claiming that the
challenge violated Batson.'0 6
B. The Eleventh Commandment?:
Thou Shalt Not Peremptorily Challenge
Thy Neighbor Based on Religion
In a unanimous decision written by Judge, now Supreme Court Jus-
tice, Samuel Alito, the Third Circuit suggested that it is improper to strike
a juror based on religion. 10 7 In dicta, Justice Alito favorably quoted the
district court: "[I] t is likely that the trial judge was wrong on the issue of
whetherJews were a cognizable group under Batson," referring to the state
trial judge's remarks thatJudaism is "a religion, it's not a nationality," and
peremptory challenges based on Judaism do not present "a Batson is-
sue."' 0 8 Justice Alito's support of the district court's analysis that religion
is protected by Batson is implicit throughout his opinion. 10 9 This conclu-
sion is further supported by the fact thatJustice Alito's opinion was joined
by Judge Stapleton, the author of the dissent in Dejesus, which advocated
expanding Batson to include religion.1 10 Because the court's analysis of
religion-based peremptory challenges was unnecessary for purposes of the
court's holding, a strong argument can be made thatJustice Alito used his
opinion in Bronshtein to frame the Batson analysis to be applied in later
cases involving religion-based peremptory challenges. 1 1 This implication
103. See id. (recalling that Eidelson demonstrated no bias or prejudice toward
defendant for being Russian-Jew, stating that her father's parents were Russian-
Jews and her mother was Jewish).
104. See id. (stating dialogue between defense counsel and Eidelson during
questioning).
105. See id. (acknowledging cause of appeal).
106. See id. (claiming that Batson extends to religion, but trial judge rejected
objection without explanation).
107. For a further discussion of Justice Alito's analysis, see infra notes 108-14
and accompanying text.
108. Bronshtein, 404 F.3d at 720 (noting that district court found Jews to be
cognizable group under Batson); see United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 504 (3d
Cir. 2003) (Stapleton, J., dissenting) ("Batson may extend to protect against strik-
ing a potential juror based upon the juror's membership in a particular religious
denomination .... ").
109. For a further discussion of Justice Alito's support of the district court's
analysis in Bronshtein, see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
110. For a further discussion of Judge Stapleton's dissent in Dejesus, see supra
notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
111. For a further discussion that, in Bronshtein, Justice Alito framed the analy-
sis for its future application to later decisions in order to expand Batson to include
religion-based peremptory challenges, see supra notes 108-10 and accompanying
text.
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is not surprising: Justice Alito consistently protected religious liberty in his
opinions while on the Third Circuit.1 12 Finally, Bronshtein held that the
rigid Batson requirements set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Simmons1 13 are merely illustrative and not compulsory,
112. See, e.g., Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 2004)
(holding that Native American's free exercise rights were violated when he was
denied religious exemption from permit fees required for keeping wildlife in cap-
tivity); Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386
F.3d 514, 524 (3d Cir. 2004) (ordering preliminary injunction for school district to
treat child evangelism group like other community groups regarding distribution
of literature because group was likely to succeed on viewpoint discrimination claim
under Free Speech Clause); Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506, 521-22 (3d Cir. 2002)
(finding that New Jersey prison policy that allowed correctional officials to desig-
nate security threat groups did not violate equal protection in view of greater pro-
pensity for violence demonstrated by members of groups); Abramson v. William
Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 289-90 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J., concurring)
(reversing summary judgment in religious discrimination suit because employee
established prima facie case for hostile work environment, religious discrimination
and retaliation); ACLU-NJ v. Twp. of Wall, 246 F.3d 258, 264-65 (3d Cir. 2001)
(finding that taxpayer plaintiffs failed to establish standing based on non-eco-
nomic injuries in their First Amendment claim because record established that
both nativity display and menorah at issue were donated to defendant Township);
Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 215-16 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding
that public school district's student-on-student anti-harassment policy was uncon-
stitutionally overbroad because it prohibited nonvulgar, nonsponsored student
speech and did not satisfy substantial disruption test); C.H. v. Olivia, 226 F.3d 198,
210-11 (3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J., dissenting) (dissenting from court's decision sup-
porting school's removal of kindergarten student's Thanksgiving poster because it
included religious themes, including "I'm thankful forJesus," arguing that for gov-
ernment to permit some points of view, but to exclude other views, violates First
Amendment); ACLU of N.J. v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 98-101 (3d Cir. 1999)
(holding that, while city's display of predominantly religious symbols was unconsti-
tutional under Establishment Clause, adding secular and cultural symbols diluted
display's endorsement of religion); Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No.
12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that police depart-
ment's policy, which prohibited beards, violated Free Exercise Clause of First
Amendment because it refused to make exemptions for religious reasons, even
though medical exemptions were made); Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d
488, 493 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that university professor did not have First
Amendment right to choose classroom materials and subjects in contravention of
university's dictates, and his suspension with pay did not violate procedural due
process where he was not deprived of employment); ACLU of N.J. v. Black Horse
Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1497 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from majority opinion that prevents public high school seniors from
voting on whether to include prayer at school-sponsored graduation ceremony).
Justice Alito's critics portray him as a sponsor of unwarranted government en-
dorsement of faith, while his supporters describe him as a champion of religious
expression under the Constitution. See David G. Savage, Alito Put Faith in the 1st
Amendment; The Nominee Upheld the Rights of Many Religions, a Subject of Perpetual Dis-
putes in the Courts, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 26, 2005, at Al ("If there is a sure winner in the
cases decided by Samuel A. AlitoJr., it is freedom of religion-any religion."); Bruce
Hausknecht, Samuel Alito on Religious Freedom, CITIZENLINK, (Jan. 3, 2006), http://
www.family.org/cforum/fosi/government/courts/supreme/a0039070.cfm
("Judge Alito'sjudicial opinions stand in sharp contrast to the ever-increasing anti-
God din.").
113. 662 A.2d 621 (Pa. 1995).
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lending further support to the notion that the court was determined to
expand Batson. 
11 4
The Third Circuit's holdings in Bronshtein and Dejesus are not contra-
dictory: Bronshtein suggests that a peremptory challenge cannot be exer-
cised based on religious affiliation, whereas DeJesus condones peremptory
challenges based on heightened religious involvement.' 15 Even if Justice
Alito did not use Bronshtein as a pulpit to criticize religion-based perempto-
ries, at a minimum, his decision in Bronshtein crystallizes the fact that this is
a toxic issue which courts try to circumvent via procedural loopholes. 1 16
In the final disposition, the court determined that Bronshtein failed to
make a prima facie case. 117 For that reason, Justice Alito remarked: "We
therefore have no need to address the question whether Bronshtein would
be entitled to relief if he had shown that the peremptory challenge at issue
was based on 'religious affiliation." 1 18
114. See Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 722 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that
procedural requirements in Simmons represent interpretation of Batson's require-
ments, not state procedural rule). To sustain a prima facie case of improper use of
peremptory challenges under Simmons, a defendant must establish:
(1) the defendant is a member of a cognizable racial group and the pros-
ecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove members of the de-
fendant's race from the venire; (2) the defendant can then rely on the
fact that the use of peremptory challenges permits "those to discriminate
who are a mind [sic] to discriminate; and, (3) the defendant, through
facts and circumstances, must raise an inference that the prosecutor ex-
cluded members of the venire on account of their race ....
662 A.2d at 631 (quoting Commonwealth v. Dinwiddie, 529 Pa. 66, 70-71 (1992))
(enumerating prima facie Batson requirements according to Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court).
115. Compare Bronshtein, 404 F.3d at 720 (quoting App. II at 424-25) (sug-
gesting, in dicta, that it is improper to challenge juror based on religious belief),
with United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 510 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that even
if peremptory challenges based on religious affiliation are unconstitutional, chal-
lenges based on religious beliefs are not).
116. For a further discussion explaining that religion-based peremptory chal-
lenges are a highly controversial issue that courts avoid, see supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
117. See Bronshtein, 404 F.3d at 725 n.10 (quoting DeJesus, 347 F.3d at 510)
(reserving decision on question because Bronshtein failed to make prima facie
case).
118. Id. at 724 n.10 (determining that Bronshtein failed to make prima facie
case under Batson); accord United States v. Chandler, 12 F.3d 1427, 1431 (7th Cir.
1994) (requiring timely, specific objection to peremptory challenge as requisite for
Batson claim); Doe v. Burnham, 6 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1993) (same); United
States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1158 n.6 (3d Cir. 1990) (declining to consider
whether peremptory challenge was based on religious discrimination because issue
was raised for first time on appeal); Thomas v. Moore, 866 F.2d 803, 804 (5th Cir.
1989) (requiring timely objection to peremptory challenge); see also Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99-100 (1986) (evaluating prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges following defendant's "timely objection"); Virgin Islands v. Forte, 806 F.2d
73, 75-76 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that contemporaneous objection is imperative for
Batson claims because timely objection delineates points that may be appealed and
avoids unnecessary reversals of errors that could have been averted at trial); cf
United States v. Neely, 980 F.2d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 1992) (requiring that timely,
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V. TWELVE TRIBES OF ISRAEL, THIRTEEN COURTS OF APPEAL:
THE THIRD CIRCUIT RESPONDS TO INTERCIRCUIT CONFLICTS
There is no consensus among the circuit courts on the use of religion-
based peremptory challenges. 1 9 State courts are similarly balkanized in
their approaches.' 20 There is also a lively debate among commenta-
tors. 121 In Dejesus, the Third Circuit clarified the difference between per-
emptories based on religious affiliation and peremptories based on
religious beliefs by bifurcating the court's treatment of the two groups.122
A. Splitting the Baby:123
Religious Affiliation and Religious Belief
The Third Circuit's opinion in Dejesus is groundbreaking because it
divides religion-based Batson challenges into two separate factions-relig-
ious affiliation and religious belief.124 This is revolutionary because the
Third Circuit is the first circuit court to proclaim that it will not extend
Batson to "heightened religiosity" or "heightened religious belief.' 125
"Heightened religiosity" is now a proxy for religion-based peremptory
challenges to allow lawyers to exclude jurors based on their religious affili-
ation. 126 For example, few lawyers would challenge a non-practicing Cath-
specific objections on correct grounds be made at trial to preserve issue for ap-
peal); United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1202 (7th Cir. 1990) (demanding
that specific ground for objection be identified at trial); United States v. Wynn, 845
F.2d 1439, 1442 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Laughlin, 772 F.2d 1382,
1392 (7th Cir. 1984)) ("To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must
make a proper objection at trial that alerts the court and opposing party to the
specific grounds for the objection.").
119. For a further discussion of the divergent holdings issued by the circuit
courts on religion-based peremptory challenges, see supra note 57 and accompany-
ing text.
120. For a further discussion of the varied opinions of state courts concerning
religion-based peremptory challenges, see supra note 58 and accompanying text.
121. See Hinkle, supra note 83, at 147 (reporting that those who support "ex-
tending Batson to religious affiliation either rely on First Amendment or argue that
religious affiliation is virtually indistinguishable from race and gender in its moral
irrelevance," while "those against extending Batson to religious affiliation express
dismay at any further inroads against peremptory challenges and argue that relig-
ious affiliation is fundamentally unlike race or gender because it is mutable
paradigm").
122. See United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 510 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating
holding of case); see also United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir.
1998) (" [I] t is necessary to distinguish among religious affiliation, a religion's gen-
eral tenets, and a specific religious belief.").
123. See I Kings 3:16-28 (relating King Solomon's wisdom in judgment).
124. For a further discussion of how the Third Circuit bifurcated religion-
based peremptory challenges in Dejesus, see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
125. For a further discussion of why the Third Circuit will not extend Batson
to "heightened religiosity" or "heightened religious belief," see supra notes 81-82
and accompanying text.
126. See Hinkle, supra note 83, at 193 (suggesting that it is impossible to police
lawyers because they can always argue thatjuror was struck for depth of beliefs and
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olic or Protestant on ajury, but Batson issues will often arise with Orthodox
Jews, 12 7 Jehovah's Witnesses 12 8 and Muslims. 12 9 By definition, these
groups exhibit "heightened religious involvement," and now, according to
the Third Circuit, a lawyer may exercise a peremptory challenge against
nearly any member of these groups on the basis of heightened religious
belief. I '( This effectively destroys any protection for religious affiliation
because the groups most in need of protection are the same groups that
can be excluded in light of DeJesus's "heightened religious involvement"
analysis.' 3 ' While this is settled law in the Third Circuit, it is unlikely to be
upheld if appealed to the Supreme Court, as one should not "split the
baby."' 3
2
not religious affiliation); see also Miller, supra note 10, at 12 (quoting United States
v. Dejesus, Crim. No. 99-728, slip op. at 19 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2002)) (arguing that
when person displays "propensity to experience the world through a prism of relig-
ious beliefs," constitutional protections disappear).
127. See, e.g., Tatum v. Cockrell, No. 3-01-CV-0262-R, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17780, at *10 n.3 (D. Tex. Nov. 1, 2001) (suggesting that prosecutors routinely use
peremptory challenges to exclude Jews from jury service because Jews favor de-
fense in criminal cases); People v. Kagan, 420 N.Y.S.2d 987, 989-90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1979) (alleging that state deliberately excluded jurors because of their Jewish
faith); Hinkle, supra note 83, at 193 (arguing that problem with wearing yarmulke
is not that it signals that wearer is Jewish, but that wearer is very Jewish).
128. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 147, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(exercising peremptory challenge because juror was Jehovah's Witness); State v.
Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 772 (Minn. 1993) (same).
129. See, e.g., Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (permitting peremp-
tory challenges based on juror's appearance because it suggested that juror prac-
ticed Muslim faith); Card v. United States, 776 A.2d 581, 588-90 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(involving prosecutor who struck juror, claiming thatjuror's appearance meant he
belonged to Nation of Islam, and thus had deeply held religious views); State v.
Fuller, 862 A.2d 1130, 1146 (N.J. 2004) (allowing peremptory challenge based on
prosecutor's inference that juror's traditional Muslim clothing signaled religious
devotion and, therefore, defense-orientation); State v. Gowdy, 727 N.E.2d 579, 586
(Ohio 2000) (striking juror for wearing religious-oriented clothing was
acceptable).
130. See United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 502 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding
that peremptory challenge based on going to church was not based on religious
affiliation and, hence, was constitutional); see also Fisher et al., supra note 17, at
619-29 (noting from studies that intense religious beliefs can be predictor of vari-
ety of attitudes); Hinkle, supra note 83, at 190 (noting that person who carries
Bible conveys that religion is important part of person's life and perhaps indicates
high likelihood of certain viewpoints, so person is being judged for actions and not
membership in group). But see Miller, supra note 10, at 12 (criticizing Third Cir-
cuit's analysis because it presumes that devout Catholics, Jews and Muslims are
identical).
131. For a further discussion concerning how Dejesus encroaches upon the
protection of religious affiliation, see supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
132. For a further discussion explaining why the Third Circuit should not
have applied the analysis differently to religious affiliation and religious belief, see
infra notes 135-59 and accompanying text.
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B. Judgment Day:
"The Unanswered Prayer for a
Supreme Court Opinion"'3
The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in numerous cases in which
it would have resolved the question whether religion is a cognizable group
under Batson.1 34 Nevertheless, other Supreme Court precedent supports
the Third Circuit's analysis in Bronshtein.13 5 Peremptory challenges based
on religious affiliation are unconstitutional because they involve the state
playing favorites among religions.13 6 Batson should, therefore, be ex-
tended to religion-based peremptory challenges to eviscerate the type of
religion-based stereotypes that were the impetus for protection of race-
and gender-based strikes.1
3 7
133. Courtney A. Waggoner, Note, Peremptory Challenges and Religion: The
Unanswered Prayer for a Supreme Court Opinion, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 285, 287 (2004)
(calling for Supreme Court to resolve debate over religion-based peremptory
challenges).
134. See generally Dejesus v. United States, 541 U.S. 1086 (2004) (denying cer-
tiorari on case dealing with religion-based peremptory challenges); Stafford v.
United States, 525 U.S. 849 (1998) (same); Hodge v. Connecticut, 528 U.S. 969
(1999) (same); Eason v. North Carolina, 513 U.S. 1096 (1995) (same); Davis v.
Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994) (same).
135. For a further discussion explaining why Batson should be extended to
apply to all religion-based peremptory challenges, see infra notes 136-59 and ac-
companying text.
136. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 532 (1993) ("In our Establishment Clause cases we have often stated the prin-
ciple that the First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a par-
ticular religion or of religion in general."); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55-56
(1985) (noting that, under Establishment Clause, government is supposed to re-
main neutral among religions and also between religion and non-religion); Epper-
son v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1968) (same); Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing
Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (same); Paul E. Salamanca, Quo Vadis: The Continu-
ing Metamorphosis of the Establishment Clause Toward Realistic Substantive Neutrality, 41
BRANDEIS L.J. 575, 575 (2003) (commenting that government should minimize ex-
tent to which it either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief).
137. See Richard Wronski, Fear of Hate Crime Lingers, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 5, 2002,
at A9 (discussing religion-based discrimination). Some faiths have stereotypes sur-
rounding them, which if allowed to influence a prosecutor's decision as to which
juror to exclude, would have the same effect as basing a peremptory challenge on
race or gender. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 123 (1983) ("On the mat-
ter of religion, attorneys who are defending are advised that Presbyterians are too
cold; Baptists are even less desirable; and Lutherans, especially Scandinavians, will
convict. Methodists may be acceptable. Keep Jews, Unitarians, Universalists, Con-
gregationalists, and agnostics."); J. Suzanne Bell Chambers, Applying the Break: Re-
ligion and the Peremptory Challenge, 70 IND. L.J. 569, 592-93 (1995) (discussing
relationship between religion and juror bias and addressing whether equal protec-
tion principles should be applied to peremptory challenges based on religion in
light of past Court decisions barring use of peremptories based on race or
gender).
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1. Batson's Holy Trinity: Race, Sex... and Religion?
In an effort to thwart racial discrimination, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held race to be a per se suspect class, demanding a legitimate
government purpose before upholding a law. 138 The Supreme Court's
treatment of gender parallels that of race when dealing with peremptory
challenges. 13 9 The Court has also urged that gender-based discrimination
is as damaging as race-based discrimination.1 40 Both race and gender are
immutable characteristics that can serve to impose stigmas on certain sec-
tors of the population.' 4 1 Some argue that because religion is not by defi-
nition inherent and unchangeable, it does not merit the same protection
as race and gender.' 42 Yet some government bodies have deemed religion
an immutable characteristic. 14 3 Religion should, and does, enjoy many of
the same protections as other suspect classes because the freedom to
138. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 294-95 (1987) (scrutinizing Geor-
gia death penalty cases and statistical evidence surrounding disproportionate
death penalty sentencing of African-Americans); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,
432-33 (1984) (discussing whether Florida court should award sole custody of child
to father because mother was cohabitating with African-American man); Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977) (discussing
zoning decision and its relation to racial discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (declaring law facially neutral, but discriminatory in effect
against members of certain races); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967)
(analyzing whether antimiscegenation laws are within constitutional boundaries);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1960) (holding law unconstitutional
because it changed voting boundaries to remove African-American voters from
district).
139. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (striking down law that
allowed women over eighteen years of age to consume alcohol, but required men
to be at least twenty-one years old); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682
(1973) (discussing woman's right to claim spouse as dependent to obtain medical
benefits equal to males claiming their spouses); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76
(1971) (striking down law that gave males preferential treatment regarding estate
administration).
140. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360 (1978)
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)) ("[G]ender-
based classifications too often [have] been inexcusably utilized to stereotype and
stigmatize politically powerless segments of society.").
141. SeeJEROME A. BARRON ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND POL-
ICY-CASES AND MATERIALS 594 (6th ed. 2002) (describing detrimental effects of
class-based societies).
142. See Kreisher, supra note 39, at 165 (quoting State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d
767, 771 (Minn. 1993)) ("[Rleligious affiliation (or lack thereof) is not as self-
evident as race or gender.").
143. See id. (presenting that some legislatures have provided by statute that
religion is immutable); see also Galloway v. Louisiana, 817 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir.
1987) (holding that to support civil rights violation, plaintiff must show member-
ship in some group with inherited or immutable characteristic to meet burden of
proof); Schwager v. Sun Oil Co., 591 F.2d 58, 61 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding that
plaintiff established prima facie case of age discrimination).
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choose one's religion is a right guaranteed by the Constitution.1 44 By fail-
ing to recognize the similar discriminatory motive behind religion-based
challenges, courts are failing to protect the individual rights of potential
jurors. 14 5
Furthermore, in his dissent in JE.B., Justice Scalia advocated that
heightened scrutiny should apply to peremptory challenges based on re-
ligious affiliation under the majority's logic, yet the majority did not refute
that notion. 14 6 Moreover, the Court also repeatedly indicated, albeit in
dicta, that religious affiliation is a suspect classification under the Equal
Protection Clause. 14 7 Indeed, in United States v. Carolene Products Com-
pany,1 48 the seminal case for strict scrutiny review under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, the Court suggested that strict scrutiny was warranted when
the law was "directed at particular religious or national or racial minori-
144. For a further discussion of the many protections afforded to religion in
the United States, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
145. See Scot Leaders, Unresolved Differences: Constitutionality of Religion-Based
Peremptory Strikes, the Need for Supreme Court Adjudication, 3 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 99,
107-08 (1997) (stating that some courts mistakenly believe "that because members
of a religious faith share the same doctrinal convictions by definition, then moral,
social, political and philosophical beliefs characteristic of the faith may fairly be
attributed to all of them"); see also Susan Hightower, Note, Sex and the Peremptory
Strike: An Empirical Analysis ofJ.E.B. v. Alabama's First Five Years, 52 STAN. L. Riv.
895, 903-04 (2000) (discussing impact of JE.B. as accomplishing little to extend
restrictions on peremptory challenges).
146. SeeJ.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 161-63 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (advocating that heightened scrutiny should apply to peremptory chal-
lenges based on religious affiliation). But see State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 770-72
(Minn. 1993) (distinguishing religious affiliation from race and gender to explain
why peremptory challenges based on religious affiliation should not be subject to
heightened scrutiny); Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 491 (Tex. Crim. App.
1995) (same); Chambers, supra note 137, at 592 (same).
147. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (internal cita-
tions omitted) ("[A] prosecutor's discretion is 'subject to constitutional con-
straints.' One of these constraints, imposed by the equal protection component of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, is that the decision whether to
prosecute may not be based on 'an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or
other arbitrary classification."'); Burlington N. R.R. v. Ford, 504 U.S. 648, 651
(1992) (finding race and religion suspect); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis and internal quotation
marks omitted) ("At the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection
lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals,
not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class."); Metro.
Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 885 (1985) (O'ConnorJ., dissenting) (recom-
mending strict scrutiny when "inherently suspect distinctions such as race, relig-
ion, or alienage" are implicated); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 81-82 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (requiring rational basis review, unless classification is
drawn on inherently suspect distinctions such as religion); United States v. Batchel-
der, 442 U.S. 114, 125 n.9 (1979) (finding that religion cannot be basis for deci-
sion to prosecute); Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 19 (1979) (classifying religion
as inherently suspect); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)
(same).
148. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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ties."' 4 9 Since Carolene Products, the Supreme Court has strongly suggested
that religious affiliation is a suspect class subject to heightened scrutiny.' 50
In J.E.B., the Court stated that there is a historical pattern of gender dis-
crimination that justifies heightened scrutiny. 1 5 1 Like gender and race
discrimination, religious discrimination has existed throughout American
history. 15 2 Although our history of religious discrimination has not been
as direct or severe as our history of race or gender discrimination, it is still
very significant and merits heightened scrutiny.
15 3
149. Id. at 153 n.4 (internal citations omitted) (proposing that any law di-
rected at particular religious, national or racial minority warrants strict scrutiny
review).
150. SeeBd. of Educ. of KiryasJoel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715
(1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Absent the most unusual circumstances,
one's religion ought not affect one's legal rights or duties or benefits."); Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) ("In short, when we are presented with a state
law granting a denominational preference, our precedents demand that we treat
the law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutional-
ity."); cf Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197-98 n.3 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(observing interchangeability of Equal Protection Clause and First Amendment
rationales in applying strict scrutiny review).
151. SeeJE.B., 511 U.S. at 130-36 (justifying why gender warrants heightened
scrutiny).
152. See, e.g., MD. CONST. art. XXXVI (forbidding jury service for people who
do not believe in God); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1989)
(recounting that some representatives at Constitutional Convention intended First
Amendment to only apply to Christians); State v. Floyd, 577 S.E.2d 215, 216 (S.C.
2003) (reversing trial court for disqualifying juror for refusal to take religious
oath); JEROME A. CHANES, Antisemitism and Jewish Security in America Today: Interpret-
ing the Data, in ANTISEMITISM IN AMERICA TODAY 4-5 (1995) (describing anti-Semi-
tism as large problem in modern era); DAVID A. GERBER, ANTI-SEMITISM IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 15 (1996) (reporting that fight to vote and other civil rights
were not granted to non-Christians by many states until late nineteenth century);
James Hennesey, Roman Catholics and American Politics, 1900-1960: Altered Circum-
stances, Continuing Patterns, in RELIGION AND AMERICAN POLITICS: FROM THE COLO-
NIAL PERIOD TO THE 1980s, 302-22 (Mark A. Noll ed., 1990) (describing U.S. history
as full of anti-Catholic episodes); Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Note, Religion-Based Per-
emptory Challenges after Batson v. Kentucky andJ.E.B. v. Alabama: An Equal Protection
and First Amendment Analysis, 94 MICH. L. REV. 191, 205 n.64 (1995) (stating that,
despite being held unconstitutional, five states' constitutions still require oath to
God in order to hold public office); Susan Sachs, A Nation Challenged: Relations; For
Many American Muslims, Complaints of Quiet but Persistent Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25,
2002, at A16 (discussing post-9/11 anti-Muslim prejudice); Michael Schwartz,
Statement to U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (Apr. 9, 1979), in RELIGIOUS Dis-
CRIMINATION: A NEGLECTED ISSUE (1979) (describing bias against Catholics in busi-
ness and academic communities).
153. See, e.g., Barton, supra note 152, at 204-07 (arguing that history of relig-
ious discrimination justifies extending Batson to peremptories based on religious
affiliation); Amy Gendleman, Comment, The Equal Protection Clause, the Free Exercise
Clause, and Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 1639, 1654-55
(1995) (same); see alsoJE.B., 511 U.S. at 136 (internal quotation and citation omit-
ted) (declining to contrast history of racial and gender discrimination, Court
noted that "[i]t is necessary only to acknowledge that our Nation has had a long
and unfortunate history of sex discrimination, a history which warrants the height-
ened scrutiny we afford all gender-based classifications today"); Hinkle, supra note
2006] CASEBRIEF 1081
25
Foti: Could Jesus Serve on a Jury - Not in the Third Circuit: Religion-
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
VIiLLANOVA LAW REVIEW
2. The Meek Shall Inherit the Earth,154 but All Groups Are Protected Under
Batson
Batson involved an African-American defendant and African-Ameri-
can jurors, and required that the defendant be part of the same racial
group as the challenged juror. 155 The implication, however, that the re-
jected juror must be a member of a religious group that has historically
faced discrimination is nullified by JE.B.156 Importantly, although JE.B.
catalogued the historical discrimination against women, the case was actu-
ally about a paternity suit, in which the state exercised peremptory chal-
lenges against all the male jurors. 1 57 In light of JE.B., it is impossible to
argue that equal protection restraints on peremptory challenges are lim-
ited to groups that have historically suffered discrimination.158 In other
words, under the Equal Protection Clause, once it is shown that there is a
history of invidious stereotypes (e.g., against women) based on a classifica-
tion (e.g., gender), then any discrimination based on that classification is
subject to heightened scrutiny, whether against the historically oppressed
group or the dominant group. 159
C. Walking Through the Valley of the Shadow of Death:160
Guidance for Practitioners in the Third Circuit
It is vital for practitioners in the Third Circuit who wish to preserve a
Batson claim for appellate review to make a prima facie case by timely and
specifically objecting to peremptory challenges on the ground that they
are motivated by purposeful discrimination.1 6 1 If, however, timely objec-
83, at 174 (advocating subjecting peremptories based on religious affiliation to
strict scrutiny). But see State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) (citing
lack of history of religious discrimination as reason not to extend Batson to relig-
ious affiliation-based strikes).
154. See Matthew 5:5 ("Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth.").
155. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (borrowing "cognizable
racial group" requirement from Sixth Amendment cases). To the extent that Bat-
son appears to rely on the "cognizable racial group" language to limit its applica-
tion to minority groups, that limitation has been overruled by Powers v. Ohio. See
499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (holding that defendant can raise Batson claim even if he
or she is different race than excluded juror).
156. For a further discussion of why equal protection restraints on peremp-
tory challenges protect both the dominant and historically oppressed groups
within a classification, see infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
157. SeeJE.B., 511 U.S. 127, 156 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The hasty reader will
be surprised to learn, for example, that this lawsuit involves a complaint about the
use of peremptory challenges to exclude men from a petit jury.").
158. See id. at 156-57 (noting thatJE.B. involved exclusion of men, yet Court
only addressed historical discrimination against women).
159. See Hinkle, supra note 83, at 144 (explaining that discrimination is sub-
ject to heightened scrutiny for both oppressed and dominant group).
160. See Psalm 23:4 ("Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of
death, I fear no evil; for thou art with me; thy rod and thy staff, they comfort me.").
161. For a further discussion of the importance of making a timely prima
facie case under Batson, see supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
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tions are not made, the court will dispense with the Batson analysis. 162 Fur-
thermore, objections must clearly and distinctly challenge the strike as
being based on the challenged juror's specific religious affiliation and not
heightened religiosity.
163
VI. CONCLUSION: REVELATION
A. So, Could Jesus Serve on a Jury?
As hyperbolic as this question may seem, it is a droll illustration of
how the Third Circuit's analysis in Dejesus and Bronshtein will apply in prac-
tice.164 Jesus was Jewish. 165 Justice Alito's opinion in Bronshtein cites the
district court's view favorably that Judaism is a cognizable group under
Batson.16 6 Therefore, in the Third Circuit, religion should receive strict
scrutiny review subject to Batson, protecting Jesus's religious affiliation. 167
Jesus, however, is a definitive example of "heightened religiosity," so
under Dejesus, Jesus could be stricken from a jury by a peremptory
challenge.1
68
B. What Would DeJesus Do?
What would Dejesus do... or rather what does Dejesus mean?169 Per-
emptory challenges have become increasingly contentious in our judicial
162. For a further discussion explaining the importance of timely objections,
see supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text (avoiding question whether defen-
dant would be entitled to relief because requisite prima facie case was not made).
Cf United States v. Berger, 224 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 2000) (declining to decide
whether Batson extends to strikes based on religious affiliation because prosecutor
provided independent reason for strike).
163. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's differing treatment be-
tween religious affiliation and heightened religiosity, see supra notes 81-83 and
accompanying text.
164. For a further discussion illustrating how Dejesus and Bronshtein apply to
religion-based peremptory challenges in the Third Circuit, see infra notes 165-68
and accompanying text.
165. See WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 672 (11th ed. 2003) (defining Jesus as "the
Jewish religious teacher whose life, death, and resurrection as reported by the
Evangelists are the basis of the Christian message of salvation"); see also Luke 2:21-
22 (noting thatJesus was circumcised on eighth day after birth in Jewish tradition);
Matthew 1:21 ("[S]he will bear a son, and you shall call his name Jesus, for he will
save his people from their sins.").
166. For a further discussion explaining why Judaism is a cognizable group
under Batson, see supra note 108 and accompanying text.
167. For a further discussion of why religion should receive strict scrutiny sub-
ject to Batson, see supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
168. For a further discussion arguing that, even if peremptory challenges
based on religious affiliation are unconstitutional, peremptory challenges based
on heightened religious beliefs are not, see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Mike Burke, Little Reminders of Faith: Teens Can't Get Enough of
WWJD Paraphernalia, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Mar. 1, 1998, at Neighbor 1 (surveying
phrase "What Would Jesus Do?"-often abbreviated to "WWJD"-which became
popular in United States in 1990s as form of imitatio dei for thousands of Christians
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system. 170 Religion is nearly universally afforded the same protections as
both race and gender-and peremptory challenges should be no excep-
tion.17 1 Although the number of devoutly religious persons excluded
from juries will likely be small, the political and symbolic importance of
Dejesus and Bronshtein is enormous. 172 The discord among courts can be
resolved only by a Supreme Court decision determining the constitutional-
ity of peremptory challenges based on both religious affiliation and
heightened religious beliefs. 173 Dejesus will rise again. 174
Anthony D. Foti
who used phrase as reminder of their belief thatJesus is supreme model for moral-
ity, and to act in manner that Jesus would approve).
170. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 232-33 (2005) (explaining that
Court has expanded Batson, but use of race- and gender-based stereotypes in jury
selection is still greater than ever before).
171. For a further discussion of how the law protects religion, see supra note
12 and accompanying text.
172. See Miller, supra note 10, at 12-13 (arguing that holding in Dejesus is ridic-
ulous insofar as it bifurcates religious affiliation from religious belief).
173. For a further discussion of why the Supreme Court should grant certio-
rari on this issue, see supra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g.,John 20:9 ("[F]or as yet they did not know the scripture, that he
must rise from the dead."); Luke 18:33 ("[T]hey will scourge him and kill him, and
on the third day he will rise."); Luke 24:6-7 ("Remember how he told you, while he
was still in Galilee, that the Son of man must be delivered into the hands of sinful
men, and be crucified, and on the third day rise."); Mark 8:31 ("And he began to
teach them that the Son of man must suffer many things, and be rejected by the
elders and the chief priests and the scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise
again."); Mark 10:34 ("[A]nd they will mock him, and spit upon him, and scourge
him, and kill him; and after three days he will rise."); Matthew 20:19 ("[A]nd de-
liver him to the Gentiles to be mocked and scourged and crucified, and he will be
raised on the third day."); Matthew 27:62-63 ("Next day, that is, after the day of
Preparation, the chief priests and the Pharisees gathered before Pilate and said,
'Sir, we remember how that imposter said, while he was still alive, "After three days
I will rise again."'").
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